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Keeping Al Legal
Amitai Etzioni* and Oren Etzioni**
ABSTRACT
AI programs make numerous decisions on their own, lack
transparency, and may change frequently. Hence, unassisted human
agents, such as auditors, accountants, inspectors, and police, cannot
ensure that Al-guided instruments will abide by the law. This Article
suggests that human agents need the assistance of AI oversight
programs that analyze and oversee operational AI programs. This
Article asks whether operational AIprograms should be programmed to
enable human users to override them; without that, such a move would
undermine the legal order. This Article also points out that Al
operational programs provide high surveillance capacities and,
therefore, are essential for protecting individual rights in the cyber age.
This Article closes by discussing the argument that Al-guided
instruments, like robots, lead to endangering much more than the legal
order-that they may turn on their makers, or even destroy humanity.
* Amitai Etzioni is a University Professor at The George Washington University and
has previously taught at Columbia University, Harvard Business School, and University of
California at Berkeley. His major books include The Limits of Privacy, Privacy in a Cyber Age, The
New Normal, and The Active Society. The authors are indebted to Rory Donnelly for major
comments on a previous draft.
** Dr. Oren Etzioni is Chief Executive Officer of the Allen Institute for Artificial
Intelligence. He has been a Professor at the University of Washington's Computer Science
department since 1991, receiving several awards including, the Robert Engelmore Memorial
Award (2007), the IJCAI Distinguished Paper Award (2005), AAAI Fellow (2003), and a National
Young Investigator Award (1993). He was the founder or co-founder of several companies including
Farecast (sold to Microsoft in 2008) and Decide (sold to eBay in 2013), and the author of over 100
technical papers that have garnered over 27,000 citations. The goal of Oren's research is to solve
fundamental problems in AI, particularly the automatic learning of knowledge from text. Oren
received his Ph.D. from Carnegie Mellon University in 1991, and his B.A. from Harvard in 1986.
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Policy makers and academics are raising more and more
questions about the ways the legal and moral order can accommodate a
large and growing number of machines, robots, and instruments
equipped with artificial intelligence (AI)-hereinafter referred to as
"smart instruments." Many of these questions spring from the fact that
smart instruments, such as driverless cars, have a measure of
autonomy; they make many decisions on their own, well beyond the
guidelines their programmers provided.1  Moreover, these smart
instruments make decisions in very opaque ways, and they are
instruments capable of learning with guidance systems that change as
they carry out their missions.2
For example, a California policeman stopped a Google
self-driving car because the car impeded traffic by traveling too slowly. 3
But who could the policeman have cited? The passenger? The owner?
The programmer? The car's computer? Similarly, Google faced
allegations that its search engine discriminated against women by
showing ads for well-paying jobs to men more frequently than to
1. Kamala Kelkar, How Will Driverless Cars Make Life-or-Death Decisions?, PBS (May
28, 2016, 11:34 AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/how-will-driverless-cars-make-life-
or-death-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/X93D-4KLT].
2. Jason Tanz, Soon We Won't Program Computers, WIRED (May 17, 2016, 6:50 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2016/05/the-end-of-code/ [https://perma.ccUQ7F-7VYX].
3. See Don Melvin, Cop Pulls over Google Self-Driving Car, CNN (Nov. 13, 2015, 11:03
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/13/us/google-self-driving-car-pulled-over/ [https://perma.cc
/8K5B-XRK5].
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women,4 and that it favored its own shops in search results.5 The
inability of mere mortals to trace how such biases come about illustrates
the challenges smart machines pose to the legal and moral order. The
same questions apply to findings that advertisements on websites
providing arrest records were "significantly more likely to show up on
searches for distinctively black names or a historically black
fraternity."6 Was there intent? Who or what should be held liable for
the resulting harm? How can the government deter repeat offenses by
the same instruments? This Article provides a preliminary response to
these and several related questions both in cases of limited harm (e.g.,
a program that causes a driverless car to crash into another)7 and with
regard to greater potential harm (e.g., the fear that smart instruments
may rebel against their makers and harm mankind).8
This Article focuses on the relationship between Al and the legal
order. The relationship between Al and the moral order requires a
separate analysis.9 Although both the legal and moral orders reflect the
values of one and the same society, this Article treats them separately
because they choose and enforce values in different ways. In the legal
4. Kristen V. Brown, Google Showed Women Ads for Lower-Paying Jobs, FUSION (July
8, 2015, 1:33 PM), http://fusion.net/story/162685/google-ad-algorithms-gender-discrimination/
[https://perma.cc/67JU-ELN]; Julia Carpenter, Google's Algorithm Shows Prestigious Job Ads to
Men, but Not to Women., WASH. POST (July 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
intersect/wp/2 015/07/06/googles-algorithm-shows-prestigious-job-ads-to-men-but-not-to-women-
heres-why-that-should-worry-you/ [https://perma.cc/Z6D7-3CJT]; Claire Cain Miller, When
Algorithms Discriminate, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com
/2015/07/10/upshot/when-algorithms-discriminate.html [https://perma.cc/M9HN-5QF2].
5. Issie Lapowsky, Study Offers New Evidence That Google Skews Search Result, WIRED
(June 29, 2015, 11:23 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/06/google-wu-study/
[https://perma.cc/TH95-FA7T]. Brian Souter has voiced concerns regarding the fairness of Google's
PageRank and search results after his web sites disappeared from Google's first-page results.
Brian Souter, Disappearing Tycoon Souter Blames Google, BBC (September 12, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-14884717 [https://perma.cc/VA6F-ZLMZ]. In the case of
MyTriggers.com, the Ohio-based shopping comparison search site accused Google of favoring its
own services over others in search results (although the judge eventually ruled that the site failed
to show harm to other similar businesses). Dan Levine, Google Wins Antitrust Victory in Ohio
Case, REUTERS (Sep. 1, 2011, 4:20 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-antitrust-ruling-
idUSTRE78050420110901 [https://perma.cc/AWQ8-UK4P].
6. Miller, supra note 4.
7. Alexa Liautaud, Driverless Car Push Faces Risk of Hacker Hijacking, BLOOMBERG
(Sep. 8, 2014, 2:06 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-04/driverless-car-push-
faces-risk-of-hacker-hijacking [https://perma.cc/J7WE-V8UB].
8. Nick Bostrom, When Machines Outsmart Humans, CNN (September 10, 2014, 9:12
AM), http://www.cnn.com/20 14/09/09/opinionfbostrom-machine-superintelligence/index.html
[https://perma.cc/5YUW-TC5Q].
9. See generally Amitai Etzioni & Oren Etzioni, Al Assisted Ethics, 18 ETHICS & INFO.
TECH. 149 (2016), or Amitai Etzioni & Oren Etzioni, Designing Al Systems that Obey Our Laws
and Values, CoMM. ACM, http://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2016/9/206255-designing-ai-systems-
that-obey-our-laws-and-values/fulltext [https://perma.cc/6YCP-6Q9Z] (last visited Sept. 29, 2016),
for a consideration of the relationship between AI and the moral order.
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realm, long-established institutions like the legislature and courts sort
out which values to enforce, but there are no such authoritative
institutions in the social and moral realms. There is no Supreme Court
for ethics-nor is one called for. Instead, the moral realm chooses
values to enforce through continuous moral dialogues that often lead to
new shared moral understandings over time.10
It cannot be stressed enough that "legal order" means not just
law enforcement, but also preventive law, such as routinely auditing
businesses, positioning speed cameras, and employing customs officials.
This Article will reveal that maintaining the law in the cyber age
requires new instruments much more than new laws.
Part I begins by specifying the unique attributes of Al programs,
which can make numerous decisions on their own, lack transparency,
and change frequently. Part II suggests that unassisted human
agents-from auditors and accountants to inspectors and police-
cannot ensure that smart instruments will abide by the law. Human
agents need the assistance of Al programs (this Article call them "Al
Guardians") that analyze and oversee the operational Al programs that
guide smart instruments. Part III asks whether operational Al
programs should be programmed to enable human users to override
them. Part IV points out that smart instruments can conduct highly
effective oversight and that such Al Guardians are essential for the
protecting individual rights in the cyber age. The Article closes with
Part V by discussing the argument that the smart instruments'
autonomy may endanger much more than the legal order in that smart
instruments may turn on their makers, kill them, or even destroy
humanity.
I. THE UNIQUE ATTRIBUTES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Reports about the legal challenges posed by smart instruments
may at first seem overblown. After all, the law has successfully
regulated a wide variety of instruments; regulations govern a great
range of things from the level of noise a lawn mower may legally make
to the emissions a factory can legally produce.
Some argue that it would be easy to require self-driving
(alternately called autonomous or driverless) cars to heed the same laws
as old-fashioned cars." This, however, would be akin to requiring that
Model T cars obey the laws set for horse-drawn carriages. Forcing
10. Amitai Etzioni, Moral Dialogues in Public Debates, PUB. PERSP., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at
27.





autonomous cars to abide by prevailing laws would sacrifice many of
their capabilities. For example, if granted a lane of their own, driverless
cars could travel safely at much greater speeds than old cars. Indeed,
history shows that the invention of new technologies-from guns to
DNA typing, from steam engines to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)-
has required some new legislation. While bolstering the legal order may
require a few new laws, it is more important to develop new
instruments to keep Al legal.
Both new and old laws require the help of Al because of the
unique attributes of smart instruments. These devices have
considerable autonomy in the sense that they make numerous choices
"on their own."12 That is, these instruments use complex algorithms to
respond to environmental inputs independently of real-time human
input; they "can figure things out for themselves."13 Smart machines
may deviate or act against the guidelines the original programmers
installed.14 For instance, self-driving cars decide when to change speed,
how much distance to keep from other cars, and may decide to travel
faster than the law allows-when they learn that other cars often
violate the speed limits. 15 Automatic emergency braking systems,16
which stop cars in response to perceived dangers without human input,
are becoming more common.17 Consumers complain of false alarms,
sudden stops that are dangerous to other cars,18 and that these brakes
force cars to proceed in a straight line even if the driver tries to steer
them elsewhere.
Al-equipped autonomous operating systems are becoming highly
opaque-black boxes to human beings. That is, people are unable to
follow the steps these machines are taking to reach whatever
conclusions they reach. Viktor Schanberger and Kenneth Cukier note:
12. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA 16-17 (2013).
13. Mass. Inst. of Tech., New Algorithm Lets Autonomous Robots Divvy up Assembly
Tasks on the Fly, ScI. DAILY, (May 27, 2015),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/05/150527142100.htm [https://perma.cc/K6NK-
YHM5].
14. Kelkar, supra note 1.
15. Joe Miller, Google's Driverless Cars Designed to Exceed Speed Limit, BBC (Aug. 19,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28851996 [https://perma.cc/Q3TB-CQNZ].
16. Chris Knapnan, Auto-Braking: A Quantum Leap for Road Safety, TELEGRAPH, (Aug.
14, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/motoring/road-safety/9429746/Auto-braking-a-quantum-
leap-for-road-safety.html [https://perma.cc/XC6L-6GMJ].
17. Mark Phelan, Automatic Braking Coming, but Not All Systems Are Equal, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.freep.com/story/money/cars/mark-
phelan/2016/0 1/01/automatic-braking-safety-pedestrian-detection-nhtsa-iihs/78029322/
[https://perma.cc/G2NR-X55X].
18. Eric Limer, Automatic Brakes Are Stopping for No Good Reason, POPULAR
MECHANICS, (June 19, 2015), www.popularmechanics.com/cars/al6103/automatic-brakes-are-
triggering-for-no-good-reason/ [https://perma.cc/Q4TD-HJSC].
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"Today's computer code can be opened and inspected .... With big-data
analysis, however, this traceability will become much harder. The basis
of an algorithm's predictions may often be far too intricate for most
people to understand."19 They add that "the algorithms and datasets
behind them, will become black boxes that offer us no accountability,
traceability, or confidence."20
Moreover, the Al programs that guide smart instruments are
learning systems that constantly review changing conditions and the
performance of the instruments they guide-and then modify the
internal guidelines accordingly.21 Smart instruments do not stop
collecting data once they have been launched; instead, further data
collection enables smart instruments to keep learning from experience
and improve their performance.22 These AI programs, therefore, may
stray considerably from the guidelines their programmers initially gave
these programs.23 Indeed, smart instruments may counteract their
makers' and users' instructions. Hence, self-driving cars cannot be
tested and certified before hitting the road and let loose under the
assumption that their guidance systems will not change in response to
new information collected as these cars drive about.
II. Al GUARDIANS
Smart instruments' unique attributes pose a legal challenge
when these instruments cause harm. Was there intent? Who or what
is responsible for the harm? And whom should the law hold liable? The
following mental exercise illustrates the issue. Imagine a bank is sued
for denying a disproportionate amount of loan applications made by
African Americans compared to those made by Caucasian Americans.
In response, the bank's officials point out that for the past three years
the bank has relied on an AI program to grant or deny loans. When
selecting a program, the bank stipulated that the software must refrain
from using race or any surrogate variable, such as zip code, to determine
creditworthiness. Still, the plaintiffs show that the program
discriminated against them by presenting to the court instances in
which the bank denied loans to African American applicants with credit
scores as good as or better than Caucasian applicants whose loans the
bank approved.
19. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 12, at 178.
20. Id. at 179.





A finding of discrimination does not settle the matter. The
questions of intent and responsibility for discrimination stand because
the law generally punishes deliberate offenses much more harshly than
unintended ones-see, for instance, the difference between first-degree
murder and involuntary manslaughter.24 It is hence necessary to
answer the questions of intent and responsibility in order to determine
who should be held liable for harm done. To return to our mental
exercise: the hypothetical court established that harm had occurred, but
it still needs to determine whether the bank deliberately caused the
harm by instructing programmers to use race as a variable-despite its
claims. Or did the program "learn" by looking at the data that race can
serve as an efficient surrogate variable for other factors such as class,
education, and geography?
The court could ask an expert in computer programming to serve
as a witness, but she is likely to point out that no human being can
"read" an Al program to determine whether the bias it showed reflects
the programmers' actions or the program's autonomous actions. Above
all, no person can trace the steps a program went through to reach its
autonomous decisions, as the program maintains no records of these
steps.25
This Article suggests that what the court-and all those who
need to determine intent, responsibility, and liability for the acts of
smart instruments-needs are AI programs to examine AI programs.
The law needs smart instruments to deal with smart instruments.
Until now, society has treated Al largely as one field that encompasses
many programs, ranging from airplane autopilots to surgical robots.
From here on, AI should be divided into two categories. The first
category would consist of operational Al programs-the computerized
"brains" that guide smart instruments. The second category would be
composed of oversight AI programs that review the first category's
decision making and keep the decisions in line with the law. These
oversight programs, which this Article calls "Al Guardians," would
include Al programs to interrogate, discover, supervise, audit, and
guarantee the compliance of operational AI programs.
Self-driving cars illustrate the role of such Al Guardians.
Because these cars are programmed to learn and adapt, they need a
particular kind of Al Guardian program, an AI Monitor, to come along
for the ride to ensure the autonomous car's learning and decision
making does not lead it to violate the law. Unlike human passengers,
24. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (further highlighting the import
of establishing whether the harm was deliberately inflicted).
25. The steps are carried out by the computers involved, on their own, which do not keep
a list of the very large number of complex calculations they make. See Tanz, supra note 2.
2016] 139
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these programs would not tire of constantly checking the speed limit
and distance from other cars, and they could carry out their oversight
duties even in the absence of a passenger.
The AI community has not yet differentiated between
operational and oversight AI programs in large part because many AI
scholars shared the original ideals associated with the formation of the
Internet. Those holding original ideals hoped that the Internet would
be a "flat" realm, a village in which all people could cooperate.26 They
did not envision a hierarchy in which some supervise and regulate
others.27 However, over the years, the Internet has turned from a
village into a jungle riddled with hackers, con artists, thieves, bullies,
and free riders. It increasingly needs order-enhancing institutions.
Hence, the world would benefit from the development of a slew of AI
Guardians, to prevent deviations from the instructions incorporated
into AI programs by their human designers.
An Interrogator AI would establish whether operational AI
programs observe privacy laws by determining whether such programs
use personal medical information to target consumers, make
employment decisions, extend or withdraw credit, and more. Such an
AI Interrogator could determine not merely whether there was an
illegal use of medical information, but also whether the abuse was a
deliberate act on the part of the programmers (or those who retained
them) or came about as a result of the operation of the AI system. That
is, an AI Interrogator could find out if the misuse of information was
the result of illegally obtaining medical data or of ferreting out medical
information from other personal information, the latter of which is
currently legal. For instance, if an AI program at a bank called in a
cancer patient's loan, the program's AI Interrogator would assess
whether the program acted on information illegally obtained from a
hospital or doctor's office or ferreted out the person's condition on the
basis of consumption decisions (e.g., a person purchased a wig, great
amounts of soap, and vitamin supplements).
Other AI Guardians could carry out a wide range of oversight
roles. Auditor AI programs could determine whether financial planning
software directs its users to investments or insurance plans in which
those who developed the software have a financial interest. AI Auditors
could also establish whether search engine results are biased in favor
of the corporation that provides the search results or its advertisers.
26. SHANE GREENSTEIN, HOW THE INTERNET BECAME COMMERCIAL: INNOVATION,
PRIVATIZATION, AND THE BIRTH OF A NEW NETWORK 33-64 (2015).
27. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,
https://projects.eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-Final.html [https://perma.cc/FF4F-KSQH] (last
visited Sept. 19, 2016).
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Meanwhile, Inspector Al programs could review Al cyber security
programs, such as those that restrict access to information, and could
report and follow up the response to incidents of unauthorized access.
As more instruments incorporate operational AI programs, the need for
various AI Guardians to carry out oversight tasks will grow. That is,
there will be more need for AI programs to keep Al programs legal.
Al Guardians have two major advantages over human
"guardians." First, Al Guardians are much less likely to violate the
intellectual property rights and privacy of those they review because
they have no motives or interests of their own. Second, Al Guardians
need only a tiny fraction of the resources and time it would take for a
human being to carry out the same oversight missions-if humans
could carry out such reviews in the first place.
III. LOCK OR OVERRIDE?
At first blush, it may seem obvious that there should be an
override device to limit smart instruments' autonomous acts. Such a
device would provide humans with a sort of veto power over the acts of
the smart instruments. For instance, if passengers in an autonomous
car witness people trapped in a burning car on the side of the road, they
would be able to stop their car in order to get out and help; the self-
driving car, without such an override, would otherwise just barrel
along. People should be able to slow the car down to enjoy the scenery
or exceed the speed limit to rush to a hospital. Some driverless cars
already have such a mechanism,28 and several states require that self-
driving cars only operate in the presence of a passenger qualified to
drive.29 New York law even requires that someone keep one hand on
the steering wheel at all times.3 0
By contrast, some have argued that no override should exist
because people would abuse it by speeding while intoxicated or driving
recklessly out of "road rage" and, in so doing, put themselves and others
in danger. As one observer put it, "[W]e often regulate and take control
from individuals precisely because we cannot trust them to refrain from
acting in their own interest."31 There is also a communitarian side to
28. John Markoff, For Now, Self-Driving Cars Still Need Humans, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/18/technology/driverless-cars-limits-include-human-
nature.html [https://perma.cc/EVW9-K25M].
29. See Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United
States, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411, 500-08 (2014).
30. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1226 (McKinney 2016).
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this argument: if self-driving cars coordinate their movements, which
would greatly enhance safety, individualized overrides would
undermine this benefit of autonomous cars.32
In response, it must be noted that the law in free societies rarely
prevents people from modifying instruments they own and operate-
the exception being those situations in which modifications would cause
great harm (e.g., driving without a seat belt). Society deters most "bad"
use of tools and instruments by punishing, after the fact, those who
abuse their power. The same principle should apply to autonomous
instruments.
Moreover, given that Al Guardians' oversight programs can
accommodate many permutations suggests that the two viewpoints can
be reconciled. An Al program could be designed to steer to the side of
the road and stop if a person overrides the original program and then
engages in dangerous behavior, but otherwise allow passengers to
override the program at will. That is, the program could assess each
override and could overrule some. Al programs should also be able to
coordinate group behavior even if some members of the group are robots
and some are human. None of this may be true of today's Al programs,
but it seems reasonable that they will be able to do so in the future.
IV. No FISHING
Although it is rarely phrased in this way, civil societies do not
seek full law enforcement. This odd preference stems in part from the
likelihood that most, if not all, citizens commit a crime at some point-
many commit quite a few. If the authorities fined or arrested everyone
who smoked a joint, drove faster than the speed limit after a few drinks,
or who did not pay gift tax on large expenditures they made for their
children, few citizens, if any, would be spared. Civil societies, therefore,
often tend to look the other way and rely on sporadic enforcement. This
quest for less-than-full law enforcement is one reason civil libertarians
reject "fishing expeditions," that is, cases in which a law enforcement
agent abuses a targeted search to try to find evidence of any
wrongdoing, not just that covered by the warrant. Such searches are
viewed as a violation of one's civil rights.33 Indeed, this is the reason
warrants include "particularity"-details about what the authorities
32. Id.
33. See Katherine M. Shelfer & Hiaohua Hu, Making Better Sense of the Demographic
Data Value in the Data Mining Procedure, in FOUNDATIONS AND NOVEL APPROACHES IN DATA
MINING 331-61 (Tsau Young Lin, Setsuo Ohsuga, Churn-Jung Liau, and Xiaohua Hu eds., 2015);





claim to be looking for, rather than just going fishing.34 Other reasons
for limiting the scope of search warrants include preventing privacy
violations, opposition to the surveillance of innocent people, and
preventing the authorities from harassing civilians.35
Making instruments smarter has a major side effect: it makes
detecting even minor crimes and misdemeanors easy, threatening the
ban on fishing and all that it protects. Both the private and the public
sectors are developing programs that can track an individual's Internet
activity,36 turn cell phones into microphones and tracking devices and
computers into cameras,37 implant tiny radio transmitters into
clothes,38 and much else. The development of these programs is
escalating due to the advent of cloud storage and the "Internet of
Things" wherein objects from refrigerators to thermostats and fitness-
tracking bands have sensors that can communicate personal
information to third parties and government authorities.39
The compilation, analysis, and extrapolation ("cybernation")40 by
AI programs of large amounts of personal information, stored or
collected by these various smart instruments, further increase the
effects of these new technologies, making higher levels of law
enforcement much easier. For example, typical CCTVs-private
surveillance cameras owned and mounted in one's business, parking lot,
or residential lobby-pick up few facts about one person at one locality
at one point in time, and keep the information for a short period. The
opposite holds true for Microsoft's Domain Awareness System, first
tested in New York City in 2012.41 The program collects information
34. See, e.g., State v. Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
35. See id. at 505, 510.
36. See, e.g., Peter Eckersley, How Online Tracking Companies Know Most of What You
Do Online (and What Social Networks Are Doing to Help Them), ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.
(Sept. 21, 2009), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/09/online-trackers-and-social-networks
[https://perma.cc/HL4J-RT9M].
37. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Smartphone Apps Quietly Using Phone Microphones and
Cameras to Gather Data, TECH DIRT (Apr. 18, 2011, 9:41 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/blog/wireless/articles/20 110417/214855 13927/smartphone-apps-quietly-
using-phone- microphones-cameras-to-gather-data. shtml [https://perma.cc/85AP-ZSJX].
38. Jenny Strasburg & Matthew Yi, Clothing Will Have Transmitters, SF GATE (Mar. 12,
2003, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Clothing-will-have-transmitters-
Benetton-to-2628532.php [https://perma.cc/T7DC-KW9N].
39. See ANDREW HILTS, CHRISTOPHER PARSONS & JEFFREY KNOCKEL, EVERY STEP YOU
FAKE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FITNESS TRACKER PRIVACY AND SECURITY 2, 76 (2016),
https://openeffect.ca/reports/EveryStepYouFake.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRK9-TWHB].
40. AMITAI ETZIONI, PRIVACY IN A CYBER AGE: POLICY AND PRACTICE (2015).
41. Press Release, N.Y.C., Mayor Bloomberg, Police Commissioner Kelly and Microsoft
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from all over the city from various CCTV cameras, speed cameras,
license plate readers, and radiation detectors.42 While the system does
not yet utilize facial recognition, it could in the future be expanded to
include such data, as well as cell phone location information.43 The
Domain Awareness System stores this information for five years or
more, and authorities can use it at will to draw a full profile of a person's
public life. 4 4 This is but one example of many in which "spot"
information about a person is combined with other information about
that person and then those data are subjected to Al analysis that
enables authorities to draw conclusions about the person, well beyond
what is revealed by direct observation.4 5
To prevent such comprehensive and continuous surveillance of
people in public, legislatures should pass new legislation that would
require the automatic erasure of information gathered by localized
instruments such as toll booths and CCTVs after a short period of time,
except in special situations like following a terrorist attack or an Amber
alert. Legislation should also prohibit cybernation of all information
except insensitive personal information,46 such as information about
one's medical condition, and ban the use of insensitive information to
divine sensitive information. To enforce these regulations,
governments should pass laws mandating the use of Al Guardians to
audit and monitor operational Al surveillance programs. In short, the
law could use Al-assisted oversight to curb Al-enhanced surveillance.
V. AI DOOMSAYERS
A small but oft-cited group of Al mavens at highly regarded
institutions like MIT, Cambridge, and Berkeley warn that smart
instruments threaten to become so smart that they will surpass human
intelligence, and these instruments may well rebel against their
makers and take over-if not destroy-the world. Rory Cellan-Jones
2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2012b%2Fpr291-12.html&cc=unusedl978&rc=1 194&ndi=1
[https://perma.cc/H592-7M6V].
42. Joe Coscarelli, The NYPD's Domain Awareness System Is Watching You, N.Y. MAG.
(Aug. 9, 2012, 8:50 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/08/nypd-domain-awareness-
system-microsoft-is-watching-you.html [https://perma.cc/283U-52GY].
43. See Neal Ungerleider, NYPD, Microsoft Launch All-Seeing "Domain Awareness




45. See generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) ("The availability and use of these and other new [monitoring] devices will continue to
shape the average person's expectations about the privacy of his or her daily movements.").
46. See generally ETZIONI, supra note 40.
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writes, "Humans, who are limited by slow biological evolution, couldn't
compete and would be superseded."47 Similarly, an op-ed written by
scholars including Stephen Hawking states: "One can imagine [Al]
outsmarting financial markets, out-inventing human researchers, out-
manipulating human leaders, and developing weapons we cannot even
understand. Whereas the short-term impact of Al depends on who
controls it, the long-term impact depends on whether it can be
controlled at all." 4 8 The Washington Post reports that
Nick Bostrom's favorite apocalyptic hypothetical involves a machine that has been
programmed to make paper clips (although any mundane product will do). This machine
keeps getting smarter and more powerful, but never develops human values. It achieves
'superintelligence.' It begins to convert all kinds of ordinary materials into paper clips.
Eventually it decides to turn everything on Earth-including the human race (!!!)-into
paper clips.4 9
AI doomsayers cite science fiction movies such as The
Terminator, The Matrix, 2001: A Space Odyssey, and Transcendence,5 0
as indications that such an Al-driven Armageddon can be imagined.
One can readily see that if smart instruments malfunction, they
could cause untold harm; a nuclear plant's malfunctioning Al program,
for example, could wreak a great deal of havoc. However, it is far from
evident that these instruments could develop a "will" of their own to
dominate their makers, let alone humanity. Granted, one cannot rule
out such a rebellion of smart instruments at some point in the remote
future, but what follows from such a statement? Should the
government outlaw the development of smart instruments and forfeit
the many and rapidly growing benefits, such as making instruments
that serve us more efficiently, cost less, and are available to more
people? Moreover, could such bans be enforced on a global level?
Historically, new technologies upon which we now rely attracted
doomsayers who turned out to be false prophets.5 1 Nevertheless, all
47. Rory Cellan-Jones, Stephen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence Could End
Mankind, BBC (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540
[https://perma.cc/3GLM-TYCV].
48. Stephen Hawking, Max Tegmark, Frank Wilczek & Stuart Russell, Transcending
Complacency on Superintelligent Machines, HUFFINGTON POST (June 19, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-hawking/artificial-intelligence-b_5174265.html
[https://perma.cc/3WN5-AVNW].
49. Joel Achenbach, The A.I. Anxiety, WASH. POST (Dec. 27, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/12/27/aianxiety/ [https://perma.cc/Q9JW-
G4CU].
50. Hawking, Tegmark, Wilczek & Russell, supra note 48.
51. The most famous case is of the Luddites who smashed mechanical looms during the
Industrial Revolution. See Adrian J. Randall, The Philosophy of Luddism: The Case of the West of
England Woolen Workers, ca. 1790-1809, 27 TECH. & CULTURE 1, 1-17 (1986) (discussing the
Luddites smashing mechanical ooms during the Industrial Revolution).
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operational Al programs should be subject to continual oversight to
ensure that their conduct does not stray from the boundaries set by
human agents. This, to reiterate, can be accomplished only by oversight
provided by other Al programs, which we dubbed Al Guardians. These
Al Guardians will need to become smarter just as operational Al
programs are improving. Because growth in human intelligence is
unlikely to keep pace with growth in artificial intelligence, humans may
have little choice but to draw on Al to check Al-and to seek to increase
oversight of artificial intelligence as the intelligence of the programs
they oversee grows.
VI. CONCLUSION
Thoughtful people have asked for centuries, "Who will guard the
guardians?"52 We have no new answer to this question, which has never
been answered well. For now, the best we can hope for is that all smart
instruments will be outfitted with a readily locatable off-switch to grant
ultimate control to human agents over both operational and oversight
Al programs.53
52. The question "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes" was first posed by the Roman author
Juvenal. See JUVENAL, SATIRE VI, at 65 (Lindsay Watson & Patricia Watson eds., 2014).
53. This last line may seem to contradict an earlier statement that oversight programs
should be protected from human override. This previous statement refers to the use of smart
instruments, but not to avoiding their use. Thus, as long as one drives a car, one will be subject to
its monitoring program. But both its operational and oversight program can be avoided if one idles
the car or if one stops using it. The same should hold for all instruments.
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